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How a country responds to a rupture such as the COVID-19 pandemic can be revelatory of
its governance. Governance entails not only the exercise but also the constitution of
authority. The pandemic response thus presents a real-world disruption to verify or
problematize some truisms about national governance and produce novel
comparisons and insights. We present a comparative analysis across four established
democratic nation-states. First, we identify concerns of relevance for national pandemic
responses and map them to state characteristics. Next, we conduct thematic analyses of
recent ruptures in India, the United States, Sweden and Norway, to form a baseline of
truisms about governance responses to frontier moments such as this pandemic, and
hypothesize their relative propensities across the concerns. We then compile comparative
data on emergent pandemic responses during the first 90 days of respective, temporally
proximate outbreaks. This combination enables us to link response characteristics to
national propensities across the relevant concerns. We identify similarities and differences
between what the pandemic responses reveal and the truisms of scholarship about the
four countries state characteristics. We argue that ruptures in democratic governance
contexts embody temporally discontiguous and country-specific patterns. They are
conjunctures of particular possibilities for bounded reconfiguration. Such
reconfiguration can intensify or shift the course of what the state is becoming. We
argue that in our cases it accelerates shifts to authoritarianism (India and the
United States), raises stark questions of national identity (Norway and Sweden) and
underscores tensions between the reemergence of welfare states and the global project of
neoliberalism. By revealing what sort of rules show resurgence across ruptures, our
comparative analysis deepens a timely understanding of punctuated politics of
reconfiguration of authority.
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INTRODUCTION
Considerable associated costs to life and wellbeing
notwithstanding, every crisis is an opportunity. What each
country makes of a rupture such as the COVID-19 pandemic
shows us something about the stability of existing state formations.
Lund (2016: 1199) argues that moments of rupture “allow us to see
that rights do not simply flow from authority but also constitute it.”
Governance thus entails not only the exercise of authority (over a
resource, such as a territory) but also the constitution of authority,
an act of state formation. In this sense, the pandemic response
presents a real-world disruption to verify or problematize some
truisms about national governance contexts. These truisms are
broad characteristics undergirded by a wealth of empirical research
on a range of problems in diverse contexts. In a chapter entitled
“Principles true in every country,”Mitchell (2002: 70) characterizes
the fallout of the cholera pandemic in the late 19th century in terms
of the reconfiguration of debt and property by institutions with
state quality that had “powers of exception.” These institutions can
extend to non-state actors in “areas of limited statehood” (Risse,
2011), which is particularly apt during a rupture such as a
pandemic where nation-states do not necessarily have the
capacity to respond on their own.
Thus—despite various caveats we mention below—studying
the real-world disruption of the “Coronavirus disease 2019”
(COVID-19) response in the form of pandemic measures
undertaken by select countries can produce several novel
comparisons and insights. The truisms drawn from
scholarship on rupture in specific nation-state contexts help us
hypothesize the sort of things to look for; the outcomes speak
back to the extent that such truisms hold true or are worth
revising in light of any new knowledge. We ask: How consistent
are insights on national responses to ruptures, drawn from
COVID-19 pandemic responses, with existing contextual
scholarship on ruptures? Drawing on Rasmussen and Lund
(2018: 393), we understand rupture as institutional orders
during “frontier moments.” These are “particularly intense
conjunctures of crisis which suspend existing order [where]
. . . the economic value of current activities is zeroed out, and
the possibility of recognition as citizens is withdrawn or
redefined” (ibid.). To these authors, such moments inevitably
cohere with re-territorialization, where authority is reconfigured
in a manner that relates to “particular institutional, legal, and
economic conditions rather than to the spatial expansion of
civilization” (ibid.). As Lund (2016: 1202) evocatively states,
ruptures are “open moments” when opportunities and risks
multiply, “when the scope of outcomes widens, and when new
structural scaffolding is erected.” Accordingly, our enquiry
foregrounds emergent non-linearity in the progression of state
quality in the ruptured state contexts that we study during this
COVID-19 frontier moment.
Political ecologists have been long interested in the nature and
workings of the state and the dynamics of its reconfiguration, and in
ever-ongoing re-territorialization processes. Scott. (1998) notes that
narrow metricization of real-world complexity through calculative
logics enables the state to multiply and strategically mobilize its
authority. Li. (2007) delineates the dynamics through which states
intervene in human lives in a purported bid to improve them.
Furthermore, Agrawal. (2005) argues that over time state
interventions shape human subjectivity itself to better suit the
purposes of the state. Thus, the modalities of governance and
popular perceptions of state quality are closely bound up with
the impact of state interventions on subjects, e.g. through
particular configurations of resource allocation and the manner
in which they are normalised.
Robbins. (2008) identifies three key strains in how political
ecologists depict state characteristics: the state tends toward
ecological simplification; it governs through networks that
reconstitute socio-ecological relations; and it institutionalizes
environmental knowledge through erasure, creation and
reproduction. While he takes a more fixed view of the state
than Rasmussen and Lund. (2018), his review shares their
concern with how the state is simultaneously a product and
driver of territorialization. He sums up that the role of the state
combines territorial strategies, political capabilities and an
epistemological system as an effect of power at multiple scales
(Robbins, 2008: 215). We approach the current rupture—the
outbreak of a global pandemic with emergent state responses—as
an “open moment” to study state quality through heightened
forms of these dynamics of control over territory and resources,
political authority, knowledge and expertise.
We proceed as follows. First, we identify concerns of relevance for
national responses to the COVID-19 pandemic based on our reading
of widespread coverage of the global pandemic response, and map
them on to key nation-state characteristics (Research Design and
Hypothesis). Second, we present thematic country analyses of recent
ruptures in four national contexts–India, United States, Sweden and
Norway–to provide a baseline of sorts for the truisms about each
country’s response to frontier moments such as this pandemic, and
hypothesize the relative propensities of the four countries across the
relevant concerns (Ruptures and national propensities). Third, we
compile comparative emerging data on the pandemic responses in
these four countries during the first 90 days of respective, temporally
proximate outbreaks (Empirical evidence by country case and by
concern). Since comprehensiveness is not a meaningful present
possibility, we include data with high certainty, and analytically
characterize less ascertainable aspects in our timeline of the four
pandemic responses. Fourth, we link response characteristics to
national propensities across the relevant concerns to make claims
about what this rupture reveals (Discussion), and then close with the
Conclusion.
This exercise enables us to identify similarities and differences
between what the pandemic responses reveal and the truisms of
extant contextual scholarship on the four countries. We do not
focus on making claims about the effectiveness of particular
responses, as the timing would be premature for robust
analysis and it is not our specialty. We rather argue that
ruptures in democratic governance contexts embody
temporally discontiguous and country-specific patterns. By
definition, these depart from business-as-usual practices in a
country, but they are conjunctures of particular possibilities
for bounded reconfiguration. If we view the state as something
that is always in the making (à la Lund, 2016), then such
reconfiguration can intensify or shift the course of what the
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state is becoming. It can create the conditions for emergent
national identities to concretize. We are interested in using
this rupture to gain insight into the changing nature of the
state in our country cases. Through this comparative analysis,
we draw out lessons from the non-linear reconfigurations of
authority that are being contested and constituted during the
ongoing pandemic in our case contexts.
RESEARCH DESIGN AND HYPOTHESIS
We have selected four country cases for comparative analysis: India,
United States, Sweden and Norway. They are all established
democracies, but display variation in terms of political history,
levels of democratic consolidation, wealth and human development,
as well as in responses to COVID-19. Our scope is limited to
democracies, wherein popular legitimacy is formally necessitated
for major shifts in governance decisions, thus we do not feature a
case of an authoritarian state, but we do attend to authoritarianism
within our cases. Norway and Sweden are small countries, andwhile
both are instantiations of the “Scandinavian Model” of democracy,
they have seen very different responses to COVID-19. The
Scandinavian Model refers to a broadly social democratic form
of governance with a strong welfare state combined with capitalist
features, notably a commitment to free market principles for trade
(Kettunen, 2011). India and the United States are large and
culturally heterogeneous democracies, but share four features
that define governance in both countries during the study
period: populism, nationalism, authoritarianism and
majoritarianism.1 They also feature great sub-national variation
that we note but cannot address within the study scope.
In this section, we first identify concerns of relevance to
COVID-19 pandemic responses. Then, we transpose them into
generic state characteristics that link directly with the nature of
authority. This is the framework with which we organize our
thematic analyses of the four selected countries, to hypothesize
their propensities on these characteristics during frontier
moments of rupture. These hypotheses are tested in our
empirical findings from the pandemic response, adopting an
abductive approach where we focus primarily on two
characteristics per country pairing to maximize analytical
import given our initially hypothesized sense of national
propensities. We thus aim to analyze tendencies related to
state characteristics in the cases where extant scholarship
suggests we are most likely to find them, without drawing
premature conclusions on the nature of these tendencies. This
affords us scope to confirm or contradict existing truisms by
analyzing a rupture. The empirical analysis sets up the basis for
our discussion of rupture and state re-territorialization in relation
to the country cases, and the conclusion offers reflections on the
implications of our analysis for political ecology scholarship.
Thus, in this section, we undertake two tasks. The first is to
identify concerns that relate to global pandemic responses. The
second is to transpose them into generic state characteristics.
Given the specificities of national contexts, the latter is necessarily
reductive, yet nonetheless essential to enable a comparative
analysis that we argue—similar to Adger et al. (2001) on
global environmental discourse and more recently Sovacool.
(2021) on climate mitigation—offers considerable value for a
political ecology understanding of governance during ruptures.
Concerns of Relevance for National
Responses
During January-May 2020, and especially from March 2020
onwards, global pandemic responses received ample media
coverage to discern some key patterns across countries. These
feature some particularities related to COVID-19 characteristics,
but are largely similar to generic pandemic measures that aim to
“flatten the curve”. The generic principles include slowing the
virus transmission rate, r, so that it is below 1 (r  1 corresponds
to one transmission per infected person) and declines, in order to
limit viral reproduction within medical treatment capacity and to
minimize the economic fallout of pandemic measures on society.
The particular strategies include washing hands, using sanitisers
and facemasks, maintaining a physical distance of 1–2 m or more
from others, and limiting gatherings to small groups.
Our reading of global coverage identifies four concerns that
feature in all immediate and short-term pandemic responses: 1)
fiscal measures and beneficiaries; 2) mobility restrictions; 3)
stockpiling and distribution of medical equipment; and 4)
extent of testing (infection and mortality rates, and relative to
national population), until such time as treatments and/or
vaccines can be developed, tested and widely deployed. These
are defined in Table 1. We see mobility restrictions as tightly
linked with employment concerns, and focus on the former since
this enables us to identify fine-grained evidence for the three-
month study period, which is unavailable in terms of short-term
employment variability statistics. The four concerns are closely
linked with political ecology concerns of control over territory
and resources, political authority, knowledge and expertise.
Linking Concerns With State and Authority
Each of the four concerns above coheres with a generic state
characteristic that is linked to state quality during a rupture.
Many indices of state characteristics exist focused on relevant
aspects: for instance, Freedom House’s index of political rights
and civil liberties, on whose 7-point “freedom rating” scale all
four case countries fell under the “free” range of 1–2.5 pre-
pandemic (Norway and Sweden most at 1, the United States less
at 1.5, and India less at 2.5) (House, 2018).2 O’Connor et al.
(2019) draw on work by the Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) to discuss the state in terms
of citizen engagement, transparency, accountability and integrity,
and show that these factors correspond in the short term with
1These tendencies are at play to various extents in any state, including Scandinavian
ones (Törnquist and Harriss, 2016).
2In the 2021 ratings, India was downgraded and categorized as only partly free,
which highlights the changing nature of state quality. See https://freedomhouse.
org/country/india/freedom-world/2021 (accessed 21.5.2021).
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better quality public services and in the long term with the quality
of democracy, inclusive growth, trust in government and the rule
of law. While a comprehensive listing of such indices is beyond
our current scope, the point is that there is some degree of
consensus on varying national propensities on specific state
characteristics, with clear implications for resource access and
equity.
In Table 2, we map the four pandemic-related concerns
defined above on to these four respective state characteristics:
1) each country has a degree of predisposition to elite capture of
political and economic decision-making functions; 2) each
country has a degree of tolerance for political leaders to act in
an authoritarian manner at odds with democracy to meet urgent
needs; 3) each country has a degree of commitment to affirmative
action to secure the interests of vulnerable population categories;
and 4) each country has a certain degree of trust in experts. These
choices are fit-to-purpose based on our interest in understanding
emergent changes in state quality during a rupture. They are not
exhaustive, but do capture aspects of the state qualities that
Robbins. (2008) synthesizes: territorial strategies (elite capture
and affirmative action), political capabilities (tolerance to
authoritarian measures) and an epistemological system (degree
of trust in expertise).
To establish four hypotheses, each linked with one of these
generic state characteristics for our case countries, we present
thematic country analyses based on secondary data in Ruptures
and national propensities. Each hypothesis takes the form of an
internal ranking (1–4) representing the lowest to highest
propensity for a characteristic by our selected countries. These
are not based on a retrospective reading of country-specific
developments during the pandemic, but solely on a review of
literature on the linked state characteristics for each country
context. We draw on research about moments of rupture as much
as possible in our literature review; however, this is available to
quite varying extents across the four countries and for different
kinds of ruptures that have limited relevance to the particular
rupture that the COVID-19 pandemic and various responses
represent. While for the sake of clarity and conciseness we use
relatively broad characterisations below to set up our analysis, we
are aware that these characteristics are debated, and indicate
through caveats that we hold claims tentatively. Indeed, the point
of our analysis is to not take these claims at face value, but to put
them to the test in terms of how they bear out during the rupture
of COVID-19 as seen in initial national responses.
RUPTURES AND NATIONAL
PROPENSITIES
Our thematic country analyses focused on the key contextual
aspects of the four countries in relation to recent ruptures, which
we understand as “open” or “frontier” moments in the wake of
diverse crises (Lund, 2016; Rasmussen and Lund, 2018). Here, we
present a pointed overview for each country case, to provide a
baseline for the aspects most germane to our study. For India and
the United States, we are particularly interested in aspects related
TABLE 1 | Defining concerns that feature in immediate and short-term pandemic responses.
Concerns Definition
Fiscal measures and beneficiaries This concern refers to the degree and distribution of fiscal measures undertaken as part of the pandemic response. These
took the form of targeted support mechanisms (e.g. baskets of essentials delivered to the doorstep) and large financial
packages passed through national legislation with criteria for distribution across sectors (e.g. to cover a proportion of
fixed costs for small businesses). It is important to consider because the pandemic has had widespread impact on
employment, and placed many population sub-groups at risk, both directly through risk of infection and indirectly through
the economic fallout of extended societal lockdown and other response measures.
Mobility restrictions This concern refers to the curtailment of freedoms exercised during regular circumstances, most notably the freedoms of
movement and free public assembly. The rationale for this is to limit the transmission pathways of COVID-19, as public
transport and large-group gatherings result in extended exposure to many people in close proximity. It is important to
consider because on the one hand such restrictions are vital to the success of response strategies such as testing and
tracing, whereas on the other hand any indefinite restrictions of this nature represent potential threats to democratic goals
such as the ability to hold public deliberation. Moreover, their impact differs widely across those who rely on public
transport and those who use automobiles, walk or cycle
Stockpiling and distribution of medical equipment This concern refers to the procurement and allocation of critical medical equipment, including both preventive equipment
(e.g. masks for health workers and for public use) and essential equipment and medicines for treatment (most notably
ventilators to support critically ill and high-risk infected patients with other underlying conditions such as asthma or lung
damage). The pandemic led to acute and extended shortages of such equipment and competition over procurement due
to spiked global demand. It is important to consider because such stockpiling and distribution is directly linked to the
extent and quality of healthcare that is possible to offer at any location, and there is a heightened risk of socio-spatial
inequalities in this regard
Extent of testing This concern refers to how widespread and intensive the measures to diagnose infection were. Early in the pandemic
response, test kits were yet to be developed, and once developed and trialled, they had to be deployed to all parts of the
population. Initial tests were typically restricted to prioritized cases, and as availability increased, expanded to cover a
larger set of people who exhibited symptoms and believed they were carriers. Rapid widespread testing proved effective
as a means to limit virus transmission, as became evident in responses by South Korea and China, which were impacted
early. It is important to consider because the degree of commitment to testing was typically determined by national
political leadership with inputs from health experts, and access to tests was in many cases conditioned by factors such as
location and class
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to elite capture and authoritarianism, whereas for Sweden and
Norway, we accord attention to aspects of affirmative action and
trust in experts. Both choices are based on traits reflected in extant
scholarship, allowing us to maximize analytical import from our
study. We then compare this scholarship to offer comparative
overall assessments in Table 3 and populate the hypotheses in
Table 4 at the end of this section.
India
The postcolonial Indian state has exhibited a strong (but now
weakly repackaged) rhetorical commitment to pro-poor policies
and affirmative action (see Deshpande et al., 2019 for a nuanced
discussion), coupled with a high acceptance of the state reposing
authority in experts. At the current conjuncture, however, the
Indian state may be described as increasingly centralized with a
strong propensity for authoritarian populist forms of governance
(Chacko, 2018), coupled with a relatively high degree of elite
capture.
Two ruptures in particular have contributed to this
development. The authoritarian populist turn commenced
from the late 1960s. Pressured by social groups marginalized
by the postcolonial developmentalist project, the long-ruling
Congress party abandoned its commitment to liberal
principles in favour of a populist, pro-poor reform agenda that
boldly promised to “abolish poverty”. This was coupled with the
violent suppression of insurgencies and the systematic building of
a large security state with more than a dozen different
paramilitary services (Hansen, 2019). This particular rupture
culminated in a brief period of Emergency rule during
1975–77, with a subsequent return to democratic elections.
The second rupture reduced centralized state control over the
economy via policies of liberalization from the mid-1980s
onwards. The state gradually facilitated the expansion of
capitalist accumulation in newly opened economic sectors.
This neoliberal turn reflects the rise of the capitalist class
within India’s dominant class coalition, and an intimate
relationship between the state and big business (Kohli, 2012).
The current charismatic Prime Minister Modi—in power since
2014—is enthusiastically endorsed by prominent members of the
Indian capitalist class, and his successful welding of neoliberal
economics, authoritarian populism, and aggressive Hindu
majoritarian politics is becoming hegemonic (Kaur, 2020). The
past decade has in this manner seen a coalescing of centralized
political authority, personalistic rule, and attempts to circumvent
civil liberties and the rule of law in the name of popular majorities
(Chatterji et al., 2019).
The prioritization of capitalist growth is legitimated with
rhetorical references to a vaguely defined notion of
“development”, but without clear plans for redistribution. This
has exacerbated already high social inequality and wealth
concentration among the country’s economic elite (Crabtree,
2018). At the same time, surveys document declining support
for democracy among the electorate. The 2017 Pew report
concluded that support for autocratic rule is higher than in
any other nation surveyed. More than half of the Indians
surveyed would support governing by the military, and an
even larger proportion supported government by experts
rather than elected officials (Chatterji et al., 2019, p. 7). As
recent elections show, voters are comfortable centralizing
political power in a strong leader (Sircar, 2020), representing a
TABLE 2 | State characteristics relevant to the four pandemic response related concerns.
Characteristics Definition
Risk of elite capture. The concern of ‘fiscal measures and beneficiaries’ relates to economic decision-making during a rupture. Such decisions are
inherently political, as they are premised on the recognition of specific actors as ones that should serve specific functions and
deserve specific entitlements. Under ordinary circumstances, a system of checks and balances ensures some degree of
deliberation and transparency, e.g., national budget allocations in democracies. During rupture, time is of the essence and
well-positioned actors have a larger mandate to act, greater influence, and less checks on power. Such frontier moments
open up for rapidly expanded authority with increased risk of elite capture.
Tolerance to authoritarian measures The concern of ‘mobility restrictions’ relates to the degree of public tolerance for authoritarian measures during a rupture.
Executive power is required in order to address urgent needs. Failure to promptly remedy problems could exacerbate their
adverse impact, hence there is greater indulgence of state authority than during ordinary times. When this pertains to
freedoms that are important to democracy, such as freedom of movement and public assembly, there is a risk that state
authority will assert itself in arenas where it would ordinarily have been held in check through instruments of public
accountability, e.g., protests against fossil fuel projects.
Commitment to affirmative action The concern of ‘stockpiling and distribution of medical equipment’ relates to the coverage of preventive and reactive
measures by the state during a rupture. While these pertain to healthcare in this instance, the underlying issue is one of state
capacity and adherence to distributive justice. The state has the imperative to govern and serve critical functions, and can
take steps to be responsive and stave off the worst excesses of a rupture through emergency preparedness. It moreover has
the ability to determine which population groups and territories benefit from such measures and to what extent. The
wellbeing of vulnerable groups is highly dependent on the recognition of their needs and, once recognized, on the effective
implementation of entitlements through affirmative state action, e.g., soup kitchens for the homeless.
Trust in experts The concern of ‘extent of testing’ relates to public trust in expertize during a rupture. Frontier moments disrupt the balance of
power relative to business-as-usual circumstances, as the nature of rupture calls for certain actors to take charge based on
their expertize, e.g., conflict resolution mediators during violence. Yet to what extent such experts can take charge depends
on the appetite shown by the state for allowing relevant expertize to be heard and heeded. National leaders can choose to
ignore expert counsel, or recognize experts as decision-makers during times of crisis and empower them to direct state
actions. Public approval or backlash to such shifts in the manner of state functioning conditions these choices.
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clear shift toward authoritarian rule in the longest functioning
democracy of the Global South.
United States
The United States presents itself as a bastion of liberal democracy,
in which the state secures individual liberties, equality, and the
rights of minority groups, while simultaneously incarcerating
more people than any other country, with steep increases since
the 1980s and the privatization of prisons (Story, 2019).
Commitments to affirmative action and trust in experts have
long co-existed in adversarial entanglement with white
supremacist tendencies and the “capitalist-evangelical assemblage”
(Connolly, 2005, p. 870). Three recent ruptures stand out to us as
turning points with salience for susceptibility to elite capture and
authoritarianism: the World Trade Center attacks of 2001, the 2008
financial crisis, and the 2016 election of a populist authoritarian.
The World Trade Center attack led to a series of
unconstitutional measures justified by the ensuing War on
Terror (Redfield, 2009). One of these, The Patriot Act,
followed the trajectory of political repression instigated by the
illegal “counter-intelligence program” (where the Federal Bureau
of Investigation infiltrated domestic political organisations
during the 1950s–60s). The subsequent systematic policing of
political dissents surfaced deep undemocratic tendencies
(Churchill, 2004).
One of the hallmarks of the American dream has been a strong
middle class and a perceived high degree of upward social
mobility; aspects that have eroded over time (Putnam, 2016).
Following the 2008 financial crisis, the bank bailouts represented
an unprecedented transfer of wealth from the public to the private
sector, which exemplifies elite capture. To say that wealth
inequality has increased barely captures the fall from grace
embodied by the new precariat since this rupture (see
Milkman, 2017 for detailed treatment). Meanwhile, in the
judicial branch, the 2010 Supreme Court decision in Citizens
United vs. the Federal Election Commission solidified the
precedent for corporate personhood, effectively establishing
money as free speech (cf. Klumpp et al., 2016; Greenhouse,
2018). Thereafter, corporations could openly spend unlimited
amounts in advertising and donations for political campaigns,
which begs the question of who elected officials ultimately
represent (Chomsky, 2017). The influence of money in US
politics compromised the political left’s ability to counteract
neoliberalism and elite capture (Karl, 2019).
TABLE 3 | Overall assessment of state characteristics for the four country cases.
Country Overall assessment
India India exhibits a relatively high degree of elite capture and relatively high tolerance for leaders who lead with authority (but
perhaps not for authoritarian leaders). It also shows a high degree of rhetorical commitment to pro-poor policies and
affirmative action, but unevenly so in practice. An irrational undercurrent of scientism and chauvinist hostility (e.g. Hindutva
science over western medicines) is visible.
United States Past ruptures have accelerated tendencies toward authoritarianism and the consolidation of power into the hands of a small
capitalist class. This has led to low confidence in the state to act in the interests of most citizens, while also undermining the
ability of ordinary people to hold the state to account. Successive ruptures have rendered it difficult to sustain faith in the 20th
century global imaginary of the United States.
Sweden The reinvention of the Swedish economy since the 1980s enables its private sector to adjust to a swiftly changing, global
economy. Coupled with a supportive state that has kept tight control over state finances since balance of payment difficulties
of the 1990s, the country is well prepared to withstand shocks. Broadly consensual economic and political decision-making
among political and business interests, strong state finances, and the capacity of experts to act independently imply that
crisis response measures generally stem from broad agreement. On the horizon, one may nonetheless note increasing
disenchantment with urban, middle-class alignment in the face of growing inequalities, growing support for right-wing
groups, and increasing risks–particularly for ethnic minorities–of exclusion from mainstream society.
Norway During ruptures in its recent past, Norway has shown the ability to resist elite capture to a large degree, and to conduct itself
within democratic rules with few authoritarian traits. Despite increasing economic liberalism and political conservatism in
recent years, at times of rupture its response has been characteristically inclusive and geared toward public debate rather
than partisanship. The ability to maintain stability and cushion the population from global vagaries undergirds strong trust in
expertize, coordinated by a state that secures rights and entitlements. Yet this is based on its economic position thanks to oil
and gas export, which is itself disrupted during the current rupture and has a contested role in energy futures, thus exposing
Norway to the contingencies of global economic shifts.








India Very high Very high Very low Very low
United States High High Low Low
Sweden Very low Very low High Very high
Norway Very low Very low High High
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In many ways, the presidential election of 2016 was a
referendum on American values. By criticizing the
international and unilateral institutions it helped to create and
declaring “America First”, President Trump abandoned the long
tradition of claiming to lead the free world. This rupture has
consolidated the use of media for surveillance capitalism and
political polarization rather than public awareness (Zuboff, 2019)
and shown the susceptibility of democratic systems of checks and
balances to open authoritarian abuse in a hitherto standard-
bearing country.
Sweden
It is without a doubt possible to claim that Sweden is one of the
countries least used to rupture in the world, given its more than
200 years of avoiding violent conflict, major pandemics and social
revolution (Malmborg, 2001). During this period, the country has
moved from a poor, agrarian nation in the 19th century to build
andmaintain—despite intense global competition—an industrial,
export-based economy, coupled with widespread government
commitment to welfare for all citizens.
Sweden has, however, undergone change in recent decades to
more closely resemble other OECD countries. This means
increased globalization, increased privatization and increased
inequality among other things (Bergh, 2014). The changes to
economic policy from especially about 1985–1997 have even
prompted some assertions of a systemic change to
neoliberalism (e.g. Andersson and Kvist, 2015). A strong
welfare system nonetheless remains in place, with universal
coverage, even as many service providers are private
companies in, e.g., healthcare and schooling (Kettunen, 2011).
Public institutions in Sweden continue to carry significant
legitimacy, led by independent experts able to act swiftly and
impartially. This is regarded as core to the low perception of elite
capture within the country and particularly to low perceptions of
corruption (Rothstein, 1998; Rothstein, 2019).
Research on values has consistently shown personal
independence as a strong response within the Swedish general
public. The individualistic nature of responses in a country often
perceived as socialist is evident in the emphasis on personal
growth in contrast with low prioritization of religious and family
ties compared to global tendencies. The role of the state in this
system is thus not so much to support togetherness in a socialist
sense, as to protect the individual from the enforced togetherness
of family/tradition and religion in a system of “state
individualism” (Berggren and Trägårdh, 2015).
Correspondingly, the tolerance for authoritarian measures cuts
against the grain of a strong societal will to exercise individual
freedoms (ibid.).
Recent globalization, and particularly European Union entry
in 1994, is increasing governance via supra-national institutions,
thereby leading to an enlarged role for experts beyond the nation
territory (Barrling and Holmberg, 2019). Like most other
countries, Sweden has experienced increased questioning of
ruling elites and advice from experts. To date, such
questioning remains politically marginalized. But signs of
unravelling faith in technocratic approaches do mean that the
broad culture of consensus in Swedish politics—based onmarket-
driven, globalized policies and a regulatory state with some
ambition to redistribute wealth—has been gradually coming
under pressure (Peterson et al., 2018 offer a nuanced backdrop
of this long-term trend).
Norway
Relative to most countries and similar to other Nordic states,
Norway is generally regarded as a strong state context
(Christensen, 2003). It is characterized by low risk of elite
capture, due to a strong system of checks and balances. It
prides itself on not tolerating most authoritarian tendencies at
home or abroad, with any exceptional incidents critiqued in
public debate. It embodies strong commitment to affirmative
action, backed by significant support to relevant global causes,
albeit with exceptions to safeguard self-interest (e.g., limited
societal acceptance of immigrants and European integration).
It exhibits high trust in experts for governance, as evident from its
considerable investments in research and a culture of rigorously
using evidence to inform decision-making.
Notably, much of what enables this contemporary strong state
has its roots in a rupture that began in 1969, with the discovery of
some of the world’s largest oil and gas resources in Norwegian
waters (Haarstad and Rusten, 2018). Contrary to many countries
experiences with a “resource curse”, Norway undertook an
exemplary political and administrative response to this
windfall (at least at home, cf. Eriksen and Søreide, 2017),
instituting a sovereign wealth fund that over the past half
century has grown into a trillion-dollar behemoth. Fossil fuel
export earnings catapulted Norway’s economy from being below
the European average to a global financial player. Thus, even in
this disjuncture there is a marked continuity of the long-standing
welfare state, subsequently backed by a strong fiscal basis for
affirmative action.
A more recent rupture forced the Norwegian state and public
to reflect on their sense of self. For instance, the alt-right Utøya
massacre of 2011 constituted a moment of national stocktaking
(Steen-Johnsen andWinsvold, 2020). It laid bare the challenges of
coordination across national institutions and sectors
(Christensen et al., 2015). Norway has thereafter strengthened
the security state and surveillance apparatus for emergency
preparedness with an emphasis on protecting strategic interests.
Bulwarked by its robust economy during the global financial
crisis of 2008–2015, Norway reached into its wealth fund in 2016
during a global oil price rut to maintain financial stability and the
value of its kroner (Haarstad and Rusten, 2018). This response, as
with previous ruptures, shows the affordances that the frontier
moment of striking oil in the North Sea in 1969 has opened up for
the country’s handling of contemporary crises like COVID-19,
but also underscores a persistent concern with national resilience
given overt economic dependence on fossil fuels with low
diversification.
Table 3 presents a summary overview of the overall
assessment for each of the four countries.
Based on a comparison of the above characteristics across
countries, we hypothesize the expected propensity for a
characteristic in Table 4, using a relative four-point scale of
“very low,” “low,” “high” and “very high.”
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EMPIRICAL EVIDENCEBYCOUNTRYCASE
AND BY CONCERN
It is already evident that the pandemic will have deep negative
economic consequences, but it is equally likely to impact the
nature of the state and the exercise of authority, both now and in
the future. As Harari (2020) has argued, “this storm will pass. But
the choices we make now could change our lives for years to
come.” In democracies in particular, the COVID-19 rupture has
most evidently exposed the tension and even trade-offs between
security and civil liberties. But it has also set in motion a set of
differentiated processes that may change national governance in
other domains. Indeed, scholars and commentators have up to
now proposed a great variety of post-COVID-19 scenarios, many
of which point in opposite directions and are not readily
reconcilable.
For example, the decisive role of the state in responding to the
crisis may resurrect desires for a strong, interventionist welfare
state with greater control over resource allocation. But it may also
lead to increased authoritarianism or nationalism (Thomson and
Ip, 2020). Similarly, the initial acceptance of digital surveillance
technologies in the COVID-19 context may, if it becomes an
entrenched technology of governance in the post-pandemic
world, lend itself to more authoritarian forms of rule,
advancing this biopolitical agenda in the ecology of state
territories. In the field of environmentalism, the increased
pressure to mitigate the looming economic crisis may torpedo
earlier ambitious climate policies; but the COVID-19 crisis may
equally consolidate sustainable post-materialist values as people
in the Global North and nouveau riche middle-classes in the
Global South see the benefits of cutting air travel, working from
home, and moving activities to digital platforms (Kuzemko et al.,
2020). The role of experts in governance may be re-evaluated in
light of the high levels of uncertainty and occasionally poor
communication of the knowledge-related side of the crisis.
However, in many societies, levels of trust in national public
health authorities have increased or remained high, even where
states—such as Norway and Sweden–proposed divergent policy
measures (Helsingen et al., 2020).
Such contradictory predictions constitute a field of possible
outcomes emerging from the rupture. We see these processes of
change as open-ended, but accelerated and modulated by the
present rupture as the latest in a series of stacked conjunctures
over time. We argue that outcomes will vary between different
democratic countries, and that the direction of change needs to be
empirically explored rather than asserted a priori.
Unlike the country hypotheses in the previous section, our
choice of empirical concerns themselves is informed by
relevance to the measures adopted by governments in
pandemic responses globally: distribution of financial
support, mobility restrictions, medical equipment stockpiling
and distribution, and infection testing. In this empirical section,
we first present strictly descriptive evidence, followed by a more
analytically oriented tabulation, and finally reflect on the
implications of uncertainty. We draw on some raw national
data as well as more fine-grained but less comparable and
reliable contextual analysis.
Empirical Evidence
We have strong evidence on national measures to adjust to the
pandemic along a similar timeline. We organize this in four
categories ordered along matching timelines: fiscal measures and
category of beneficiaries, mobility restrictions, stockpiling and
distribution of medical equipment; and the extent of testing
conducted with results in terms of infection and mortality and
as population proportion. Day zero (first known incidence) is
specified for each country. This evidence allows us some
commensurability across four distinct contexts. For a visual
overview, please see virus spread (based on positive tests) in
the four case countries in Supplementary Appendix A, drawn
from the “OurWorld in Data” and “Worldometer” websites (also
see gray literature data sources by country, provided in
Supplementary Appendix B).
India (Day Zero  January 30, 2020)
Fiscal Measures and Beneficiaries
None During the First Month. Day 30–60: State Chief Ministers
announced various economic “stimulus packages” and/or daily
wage payments for labour categories. The Union Finance
Minister announced a USD 24 billion national relief package,
primarily for migrant labourers and daily wage earners, with USD
2 billion targeted to strengthen the healthcare sector. Wages
worth INR 4431 crore (USD 600 million) pending under a
national employment guarantee program were released. Heavy
food grain subsidies were announced for 800 million Indians. The
PM Citizen Assistance and Relief in Emergency Situations Fund
(PM Cares) fund was set up with the PM as Chairman, to enable
tax-deductible “micro-donations” to fight COVID-19. Day
60–90: PM Cares allocated INR 3100 crore (USD 400 million)
to purchase ventilators and help stranded migrant workers.
Various direct benefit transfer schemes targeted farmers,
women, self-help groups, pensioners, widows and the
homeless. Day 90-: Economic aid package worth USD 265
billion announced.
Mobility Restrictions
Day 0–30: Thermal Screening of Foreign Arrivals from Select
Countries. Day 30–60: All non-essential traveller visas, land
border crossings and air travel suspended. The government
issued an advisory encouraging social distancing measures.
Different states began to restrict mobility and close
educational institutions. This was followed by a one-day
national “people’s curfew” as a trial run for a 21-days
nationwide lockdown on day 55. Day 60–90: Nationwide
lockdown extended by 21 days. Day 90-: Nationwide lockdown
extended twice for altogether 28 days. The lockdown and
restrictions on mobility were graded into red, orange and
green zones, depending on the degree of viral spread.
Medical Equipment Stockpiling and Distribution
Day 0–15: The export of personal protection equipment (PPE)
including masks, gloves and ventilators, was banned, then
permitted a week later. Day 15–30: Concerns arose over future
medical production, given broken supply chains with COVID-
19-hit China. Day 30–60: Major hospitals reported shortage of
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PPE. Concerns were raised about possible shortage of
government hospital beds and ventilators. PPE exports banned
again, including the export of raw material for protective masks,
and the export of anti-malaria drugs believed to work against
COVID-19. Day 60-: Shortage of ventilators, import of used ones
allowed. Concerns over testing and treatment capacity persisted,
as infection numbers continued to increase.
Testing degree (per thousand people), infected (% of tested
population), mortality (% of tested population): Day 0–30: testing
<0.01, infected <0.01%, 0% mortality. Day 60: testing <0.01,
infected (1,251 cases), mortality (29 dead). Day 90: testing
0.03, 4.29% infected, 0.131% mortality. Day 115: testing 0.07,
4.57% infected, 0.127% mortality.
United States (Day Zero  January 20, 2020)
Fiscal Measures and Beneficiaries
None initially. Day 60: Initially, USD 8.3 billion was targeted to
public health agencies and vaccine research; and USD 192 billion
for the Families First Coronavirus Response Act, addressing
unemployment insurance benefits, increased Medicaid and
food-security spending, free testing, and tax credits to offset
costs for employers obligated to offer paid sick leave and
family leave. Day 90: The USD 1,721 billion CARES Act
included USD 500 billion for loans to large companies deemed
critical to national security, and to state and municipal
governments; and USD 380 billion for loans to small
businesses to avoid laying off employees with costs related to
rent and payrolls, and to utilities eligible for loan forgiveness.
Taxpayers with annual incomes up to $75,000 were to receive a
one-time payment of USD 1,200, with an additional USD 500 per
qualifying child. Unemployment benefits were expanded. USD
150 billion was earmarked for healthcare providers, and various
tax incentives instituted, including deferral of payroll taxes that
fund Social Security and Medicare.
Mobility Restrictions
Day 0–15: A federal 14-days quarantine was issued for returnees
from China; a presidential order denied entry to foreign visitors
to China from the past 2 weeks; a high-alert travel advisory
discouraged US citizen travel to China. Day 60: A travel ban
denied entry to non-US citizens who had visited Iran or the
Schengen area within 2 weeks. 19 states, and Navajo and Yakima
nations, issued stay-at-home orders. Day 90: 42 states, and Guam
and Puerto Rico, had state-wide stay-at-home orders in place,
whereas 19 states had eased such orders. Three cities in states
without orders had issued their own orders.
Medical Equipment Stockpiling and Distribution
Day 30: Health professionals warned about impending dangerous
shortages of PPE and ventilators. Day 60: Federal, state and local
governments competed in the market to secure medical supplies
at inflated prices. Day 90-: 90% of the federal stockpile of medical
equipment had been distributed to states, and the Defense
Production Act had been partially enacted to produce
ventilators and m95 masks to meet nationwide shortages.
Testing degree (per thousand people), infected (% of tested
population), mortality (% of tested population): Day 15:
negligible testing, 0.78% infected; 0% mortality. Day 30:
negligible testing, 0.66% infected; 0% mortality. Day 60: testing
0.62, 26.78% infected; 0.4% mortality. Day 90: testing 12.19,
18.85% infected; 1.09% mortality. Day 120: testing 38.09,
infected 12.23%, mortality 0.69%.
Sweden (Day Zero  January 31, 2020)
Fiscal Measures and Beneficiaries
None during the first month. Day 30–60: Repeated and updated
fiscal measures were announced by the government and Central
Bank. These measures received support from opposition parties,
who pushed for even larger measures in a shift from earlier broad
political agreement about fiscal prudence as a key political goal.
The specific thrust related to unemployment benefits, improved
sick leave remuneration, and support to companies forced to
retrench employees. Day 90: Fiscal measures reached 10.4–16.1%
of GDP (SEK 523–811 billion, approximately USD 55–85 billion)
in 3 months. The government continued to reiterate the state’s
financial strength and existing political consensus supported
continued spending. A clear message from the government
was that the historical break from 30 years of fiscal prudence
to state-backed financial crisis management was far from
reaching its limits.
Mobility Restrictions
Day 0–15: No restrictions. Day 30: No restrictions. Day 60:
Incoming international travel was restricted in Sweden as part
of European Union legislation. Recommendation issued to
citizens not to travel to high risk countries drastically reduced
non-essential travel while keeping borders formally open.
Recommendation issued to reduce domestic mobility between
cities and regions. Advisories specifically targeted people above
age 70 to refrain from any social interactions outside the
household. Breaches to recommendation not liable for fine or
other form of penalty, in line with the overall Swedish approach
to combating COVID-19 based on personal responsibility. Day
90: Air travel down 90%. Initial recommendation not to cross
municipal borders relaxed to a recommended travel radius of
1–2 h by car.
Medical Equipment Stockpiling and Distribution
Day 0–15: Significant scarcities were reported across all forms of
supplies other than ventilators. Preparations were slow and stock
stayed low. In the 1990s, successive governments reduced all
military and strategic medical stocks, selling or discarding the last
in the 2000s. Day 15–30: Shortages became particularly apparent
in elderly care homes. The supply system lacked a national thrust.
The government Social Board only acted as an advisory body to
regional hospital administrations, which slowly coordinated
supplies with hundreds of care home providers. Several
international orders for essential supplies were cancelled due
to closed borders. Day 30–60: Ad hoc supply arrangements and
repurposing old equipment largely met needs despite rapidly
increasing patient numbers. Day 60–90: No significant shortages
were reported after orders worth SEK 1 billion, as domestic
industries and civic initiatives fulfilled demand and imports
commenced.
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Testing degree (per thousand people), infected (% of tested
population), mortality (% of tested population): Day 15: testing
0.51, infected 20%, mortality 0.01%. Day 30: testing 3.65, infected
0.06%, mortality 0.05%. Day 60: testing 5.44, infected 27.18%,
mortality 3.94%. Day 90: testing 14.67, infected 20.46%, mortality
2.45%. Testing proved difficult to scale, first due to uncertainties
with the technology and specific supplies, and later due to
logistical and staff constraints. Testing was not prioritized by
the Public Health Authority.
Norway (Day Zero  February 25, 2020)
Fiscal Measures and Beneficiaries
Day 15: the first fiscal measures were introduced, with preliminary
rules published on changes to working life and unemployment
benefits. Essential services–healthcare and consumables–were
maintained, whereas other activities–including kindergartens
and schools–were conducted remotely or suspended. Day 30:
Notably, by day 19, a crisis package of NOK 100 billion
(approximately USD 10 billion) enabled loans to impacted
businesses. The lockdown continued, with health advisors and
the government adapting policies in concert. The large welfare
state safety net offered support to laid-off employees. Day 60:
Some lockdown rules were eased, with non-essential services
reopening with mandatory social distancing. The period for
unemployment benefits was prolonged by 18 days. Day 90: The
right to seek compensation for laid-off employees was temporarily
extended to cover workers from outside the European Economic
Area. Almost all economic activities gradually resumed.
Mobility Restrictions
Day 15: A national lockdown was announced and rapidly
enforced. Only essential travel was permitted, with restrictions
on incoming foreigners, including 14-days quarantine.
Norwegians abroad were asked to return to Norway unless
stationed abroad long-term. Day 30: The northern region
Nordland banned travel from southern regions, despite central
government contestation. Municipal measures often exceeded
and preceded similar national rules, e.g., on business closures.
Those exhibiting mild symptoms were mandated 14-days self-
isolation. Day 60: Air travel abroad was down 90 percent. Limited
use of public transport was encouraged, and socially distanced
hikes recommended. Kindergartens and schools partially
reopened, while remote work was recommended. Day 90:
Schools reopened fully, and most employers resumed near-
regular work practices, with minimal use of public transport
encouraged. Buses and trains ran with half their capacity marked
as non-use.
Medical Equipment Stockpiling and Distribution
Day 0–30: Initially, total respirator capacity was not revealed to
strategically avoid panic. Then, Norway announced it had 682
ventilators. An industry-defense collaboration ensured
production of 600–1,200 emergency ventilators to meet
estimated needs. The government assured funding for 1,000 of
these, which health experts however criticized as inadequate for
COVID-19. Day 30–90: The pandemic measures flattened the
curve and demand for ventilators stayed far below maximum
estimates. COVID-19 hospitalisations peaked at 325 patients by
Day 35, and declined steadily to below 40 by Day 90.
Testing degree (per thousand people), infected (% of tested
population), mortality (% of tested population): Day 15: testing
1.52, infected 11%, mortality <0.01%. Day 30: testing 12.25,
infected 5.74%, mortality 0.02%. Day 60: testing 24.20, infected
5.76%, mortality 0.15%. Day 90: testing 38.48, infected 4.01%,
mortality 0.11%.
We have anecdotal evidence and emerging detailed reportage
on the effects of pandemic responses on different societal actors.
We organize this in terms of: distribution of state support (where
transparency is not sufficient to assume a match with formal
allocations); repercussions on vulnerable categories (e.g.
migrants, hospitality sector, temporary workers, tourism
sector, the homeless, self-employed and small businesses);
protection for healthcare personnel and other frontline
workers; and maintenance of law, order and personal
freedoms. This reflects political ecology concerns related to
resource allocation, equity and rights, and the exercise of
authority. Our evidence base is limited to online coverage (in
English, Swedish and Norwegian languages) and we aim not at
comprehensiveness but at sufficient coverage to support and
enrich analytical characterization of variation across countries
and conjunctural explanation for each case. We present findings
in Table 5. This also highlights the varying challenges the
countries faced in terms of state capacity.
The Implications of Uncertainty
In terms of uncertainty, there are moreover a number of
unknowable facts, both at the time of writing and possibly
also later. These include actual numbers of deaths caused by
COVID-19, for which testing and monitoring is insufficient,
especially in India and to some extent the United States, but
also in Sweden based on comparisons of death rates during the
same time period in recent years, which exhibit a wider difference
than deaths attributed to COVID-19. This also holds true of
infected person counts, where testing matters even more; testing
rates varied widely and remained abysmally low in India, with
Norway having the most rapid rollout among the four cases. Even
more challenging to understand at present are the alternative
costs to lockdown, i.e., the decreasing wellbeing that stems from a
lack of other medical care for serious ailments such as cancer or
cardiovascular diseases with severe long-term consequences, as
well as from the socio-economic effects of the lockdown. The
latter includes joblessness and social isolation, both with well-
known effects on personal health. Similar health challenges have
been noted from past economic downturns (Zivin et al., 2011),
and there is no reason to think that the deep economic difficulties
caused by the pandemic and societal responses will not follow
similar future patterns.
Importantly, we cannot know at present how well or otherwise
containment strategies work over time in terms of infection
transmission and mortality effects, and in terms of economic
and socio-political repercussions. These uncertainties place clear
limits to the scope of our analysis, but because our research design
recognizes this, they do not affect the validity of the claims we put
forward, which have a basis in evidence.
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DISCUSSION
The Pandemic as a Rupture That Follows
Rules?
Having taken stock of the emerging empirical evidence in the
previous section, we discuss key similarities and differences
between the truisms from extant scholarship focused on rupture-
relevant characteristics on the one hand, and the pandemic-specific
findings for each of the four countries on the other hand.
India
What is confirmed by COVID-19? COVID-19 has confirmed and
even accelerated India’s turn toward authoritarian populism, with its
attendant implications for the concentration of power and privilege.
The political response to the virus has certainly been populist, insofar
as it has been strong on rhetoric and symbolism, but relatively weak
on substance. It was announced relatively late compared to other
countries, and with severely inadequate preparation and planning on
implementation and consequences. However, the strict nationwide
lockdown signalled Modi’s individual capacity for decisiveness,
determination, and sacrifice, thus enhancing his standing as a
strong national leader. Concurrently, the authoritarian tendency
surfaced clearly in violent police crackdowns on people unable to
observe curfew, such as the homeless and returningmigrant workers,
highlighting low commitment to affirmative action and equitable
resource allocation in remedying pandemic impacts. The lockdown
period has also confirmed India’s adherence to neoliberal economics.
Economic stimulus packages were announced late and were small
compared to most other countries in terms of additional resources
allocated. Fiscal conservatism was prioritized over economic aid so
that even the large stimulus package announced in May with much
fanfare and populist rhetoric reportedly left both business leaders











India Shortage of equipment, hospital beds
and trained doctors is a general
feature of India’s poor public health
system. COVID-19 exposed ‘the gap’
between rural and urban healthcare,
as well as those between public and
private, facilities
High impact on migrant workers and
the homeless who cannot “stay at
home” and who lose their work, and
live stranded with high exposure in
camps, where there are some
reports of protests. Weakening of
labour laws in many states, to
supposedly enable reemployment
after COVID-19.
High indirect impact on the agrarian
economy as supply chains are
broken and the harvest delayed
Frequent reports of lack of PPE
among health staff and frontline
workers. Doctors and nurses
report being censored from
reporting PPE shortage and being
attacked and spat on “in the field”
as people fear them as carriers
Full national lockdown from late March
under the national disaster
management Act. Near-total ban on
all mobility; all but essential service
establishments closed
Concentration of power in the
executive. Courts functioning at
heavily reduced capacity
Police brutality reported against
people in breach of curfew, especially
migrant workers returning home
Muslim missionary organization widely
blamed for spread
United States Distribution of federal stockpile of
medical supplies to states was
uneven, with no logic published on
who gets what, and assertions of
partisan biases
Significantly higher rates of infection
and mortality in long-term care
facilities, homeless shelters, native
tribal territories, communities of
color, prisons, migrant detention
centers, and meat processing
plants (which stayed open by
presidential order) (CDC, 2020)
By april, the majority of health
institutions had less than 2 weeks
supply of PPE, 20% of those
surveyed had no remaining supply
of respirator masks, gowns or face
shields (GetUsPPE, 2020)
No federal stay at home orders were
issued. Each state declared different
restrictions on personal freedoms with
some issuing none. Black and latino
people were arrested and fined at
higher rates for violating social
distancing regulations (kaplan and
hardy, 2020)
Support to dependent territories and
native tribal territories was minimal
Sweden Stockpiles of medical equipment
were low, but alternative supply was
swiftly identified and distributed,
along with rapidly updated
recommendations and training.
Intensive care units were scaled up to
cope with the large patient influx
There was high impact in elderly
care homes and among minority
populations
Initial lack of PPE, but hospital staff
were not widely infected, with low
mortality rates
No lockdown orders, no closure of
schools, shops or offices.
Recommendations rather than strict
orders were issued to train the
population to change behaviour long-
term, and to protect vulnerable
groups.
The state was active in budgetary
support but not in the core public
health policy, which was left to, and
led by, public health experts
Death rates were higher than normal
but still comparable to regular flu
seasons
Lack of protective equipment and
lack of skills within elderly care
homes appeared to be significant
reasons for high rates of infections
and mortality among the elderly Many officeworkers shifted toworking
from home, and universities switched
to online education. Most other
aspects of everyday life remained the
same
Norway Moderate but manageable pressure
on intensive care units when the virus
peaked, with ample financial support
Very low rates of infection and death
in the population. The death rate in
the population during COVID-19
and its social profile is comparable
to an average year. More adverse
impact of the lockdown on
precarious workers
Rules were made and
implemented to ensure that
frontline workers (healthcare,
supermarkets, cargo) had
adequate PPE, and medical
personnel were supplied with
sufficient PPE through mass
imports and domestic efforts
National borders were closed with 14-
days quarantine imposed on return.
Educational institutions and many
public offices closed. Many
businesses were closed temporarily
but reopened with social distancing
measures. Working from home was
encouraged, and non-essential travel
was discouraged
Wide-ranging support to all
categories of the population,
although tilted in favour of large
businesses
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and social activists “underwhelmed”. In a similar neoliberal and
authoritarian vein, the lockdown period has been used to push
through dilutions to labour rights and environmental protection in
the name of economic growth, with very little parliamentary debate.
This shows a tendency toward elite capture. And, in line with
dominant Hindu nationalist tendencies, the Muslim organization
Tablighi Jamaat has been blamed for bringing the virus to India and
spreading it via “corona jihad”, which shows an effort to channel
blame away from the state apparatus and toward a vulnerable group
in an increasingly Hindu fundamentalist context.
What is challenged by COVID-19? Rather than outright
challenging hypothesized propensities about India, the
COVID-19 crisis shines a clearer light on aspects of these
propensities. In this regard, COVID-19 potentially helps us
see the contours of state capacity and authority more clearly,
especially in the domain of poverty reduction. Specifically, the
inability or unwillingness of the government to aid the millions
of migrant workers who were immediately affected by the
lockdown tells us several important things. First, it indicates
that the Indian state has–for ideological reasons that align with
neoliberal ethics of individual entrepreneurship and
responsibility–now more decisively abandoned its
commitment to welfare, redistribution, and pro-poor
interventions. The state, in other words, can be tough on
dissent (when people break curfew) but indifferent to social
suffering, constructing territories of exclusion and conditions
for injustice. Second, it also indicates that the Indian state, in
spite of being hailed as an emerging market with high growth
rates for many decades, remains a relatively poor state with
limited capacity to address situations of intense crisis, which
reflects poorly on the role of expertize in governance. Third, the
inability to handle the humanitarian fallouts of the crisis and the
lockdown shines a light on the lopsided nature of economic
growth encouraged by the Indian state over decades, where
precious little has been channelled into improving public
infrastructure such as the health system. Decades of high
economic growth may well have lifted hundreds of millions
of people out of poverty, but only barely so. And the COVID-19
crisis has already pushed 75 million of them back into poverty.3
This suggests a political ecology where the state commits
resources less to vulnerable groups and more to shore up its
own authority; ironically, this rupture’s stark exposure of this
tendency may itself undermine such state authority.
United States
What is confirmed by COVID-19? A crisis situation like COVID-19
could perhaps lead us to expect that existing institutions would
reassert their value in trusted modes of governance and in the value
of science. This has, however, not happened. On the contrary, lack of
initiative, misinformation, and radically uncertain blame games have
characterized the US response. Dissonance between the imagined
greatness of the United States and the realities of domestic poverty,
disenfranchisement and partisan polarization have crippled public
debate. Characterized by “post-truth” (cf. McIntyre, 2018), the
pretence of accountability has been abandoned. A continuum
across discontiguous ruptures from 9/11 to COVID-19 can be
seen to concentrate power in the state apparatus while
undermining accountability across sectors (cf. Daoudi, 2020). The
federal state’s attention is mainly focused on business, and its
initiatives are accompanied by the risk of elite capture, as tax
credits and spending benefit large companies and already-wealthy
large business owners. The vulnerability of many groups as exposed
through past ruptures continues to deepen, with little to no
commitment to affirmative action in the national COVID-19
response in the study period. In some ways, the state response to
COVID-19 has exacerbated the challenges faced by marginalized
communities.
What is challenged by COVID-19? The pandemic appears to
challenge the United States’s role as a global leader in the world.
Trust in the state apparatus use of experts may be even lower than
hypothesized, with the then-president announcing that he is taking
chloroquine to prevent contracting COVID-19, a drug that experts
agree is not proven to be effective and could lead to harm (cf.
Yazdany and Kim, 2020). While anti-vaccination groups had been
marginal before the pandemic, they have been bolstered by the
then-president, increasing the challenge of eventual vaccination
drives and revealing little respect for expertize in formal
governance mechanisms. By contrast, tolerance to authoritarian
measures may be lower than hypothesized. The lockdowns and
stay-at-home orders represent the first time a large section of the
population has so viscerally experienced authoritarian measures,
which until now had mostly impacted marginalized groups. While
previous erosions of the constitution in the name of countering
terrorism and economic collapse went largely unchallenged, this
temporary restriction of personal freedoms in the name of public
health has been met with vehement and sometimes armed
opposition in several states. This underscores limits to state
authority and suggests an evolving political ecology where
individual power can be exercised to erode formal authority.
Sweden
What is confirmed by COVID-19? Prior to the COVID-19
pandemic Sweden was experiencing, on the face of it, one of
its most successful periods of sustained economic growth, low
unemployment and strong state finances. And yet, national
politics were under strain with increasing inequalities
apparent, rising concerns of violent crime and populist, and
heightening anti-immigrant sentiments. Rather than putting
further pressure on national authority, COVID-19 appears to
have strengthened a weak coalition government under pressure,
and generated greater overall confidence in the government and
the need for a strong state among the general public. This is
evident from a number of national polls carried out since the start
of the crisis. Similarly reaffirmed trust is exhibited in government
experts who were otherwise undermined by the widespread
outsourcing of activities to the private sector, and the growing
support for populist parties who challenge elites and technocratic
knowledge. General trust in the national approach to COVID-19
has been supported by the political opposition which has
3Source: Covid pandemic pushes 75 million more people into poverty in India:
Study accessed on 16.4.2021 at https://www.cnbc.com/2021/03/19/covid-
pandemic-pushes-75-million-more-people-into-poverty-in-india-study.html.
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refrained from critical remarks, other than to request increased
state spending, marking a move to expand state authority over
resource allocation. As the pre-pandemic mainstream political
consensus appeared under challenge from right-wing populism,
this rupture marks a reassertion of the welfare state model of
governance.
What is challenged by COVID-19? Challenges in the short term
appear modest, in large part due to coalescing political and
technocratic elites keen to see out the crisis before any wider
debate or reckoning takes place. The somewhat retreating Swedish
state with its emphasis on fiscal prudence and market forces is, as
noted above, reasserting its usefulness during the crisis. State
spending has regained popularity with a wave of economic
packages and forms of support granted for citizens as well as
businesses, revealing a broadly egalitarian governance approach to
resource allocation. Relatedly, emergency response systems and
particularly emergency supplies are also back in favour, if not to
replace then at least to ascertain the need for national emergency
preparedness of critical items. In recent decades, these have been
procured through a globalized, efficient supply system with China at
the center. On a complementary note, poor worker conditions within
elderly care homes have resulted in reduced education, skills and
overall quality of treatment, and here, neoliberal policies and forms of
governance may require a rethink. However, major reforms reducing
employment security have been proposed in the meantime, based on
earlier promises during coalition government formation in early
2019. This marks an evolving political ecology where care
workers, instead of being supported through affirmative action as
a vulnerable group, are further marginalised.
Norway
What is confirmed by COVID-19? Norway’s response to this
pandemic is closely aligned with its state characteristics at times
of previous ruptures. The population relies on the state to safeguard
its interests, and in rising to this need the state simultaneously
secures its own interests—of political stability, of a strong large
industrial presence as an economic backbone, and of a well-
functioning political-administrative democracy. The leverage
Norway gained from its adept handling of the 1969 rupture is
evident in how it navigated the early stages of COVID-19,
responding rapidly with preventive measures at significant
economic cost, and being adaptive in the extent and duration of
lockdown based on health expertize and administrative savvy. It is
hard to separate political coordination and financial leverage when
attributing reasons for its response—having a financial cushion
made pandemic response easier. While this seems plausible in
hindsight, the step-by-step response was nonetheless marked by
uncertainty: would people accept stringent lockdown measures
before a major outbreak? And would the economic burden be
justified as the pandemic continued, potentially for over a year,
requiring less expensive measures? It appears that the state, by acting
decisively and being responsive to changing needs, was able to create
political appetite and a constituency that backed its stringent
response, enlarging its authority and control over resources.
What is challenged by COVID-19?Despite strong public approval
of the state’s response to COVID-19, and broad agreement across
political parties, the pandemic brought out a weakness that marks a
persistent rift in Norwegian politics—its future in the global
economy. Demand for oil slumped globally during the pandemic,
and the Norwegian kroner fell sharply, highlighting the complexity
and contingency of a governance approach so reliant on the global
ecology of fossil fuel. A scandal emerged contemporaneously, with
Norway’s oil major posting a NOK 200 billion (approximately USD
20 billion) loss in its US operations (NRK, 2020). The political right
made a push to go all-in on jobs and abandon environmental
considerations in the face of layoffs and rising unemployment.
The green party pushed for a green economic recovery package
and environmental commentators critiqued state support to oil
interests. These political dynamics are notable beyond Norway in
Europe and elsewhere, but for Norway they pose a question of future
identity and deepening divides in what governance approach enjoys
public legitimacy and drives resource use. Thus, this rupture
constitutes an antithesis of the 1969 rupture where the national
“oil adventure” began; it forces a stocktake on how andwhenNorway
can exit this adventure without courting economic disaster, and what
can replace its dominant industry. Unlike the 2001 and 2011
ruptures, when the security state united political interests, or the
2016 exception when the sovereign wealth fund bolstered a faltering
kroner, this rupture brings to the fore a question of national interest
where a single direction of consensus is as yet unclear. It is clear that
the state must urgently confront its own identity.
Cross-Cutting Concerns and
Characteristics
In considering how these concerns cut across our four cases, we note
that the COVID-19 response provides us with a crystallization of
existing trends within each country setting. The pandemic has
accelerated reluctance to use the central government as a tool of
intervention when it might upset the fiscal balance, leading to a
delayed response carried out in haste in neoliberal India and the
United States. Conversely, state spending has increased in Sweden
and Norway. Previously frugal national budgets compared to earlier
decades of state spending are here coming in for a major revision. In
all cases, the rupture has accelerated existing tendencies in the
political ecology of resource governance.
The comparisons across our four countries focused especially on
India-USA and Norway-Sweden for reasons of commensurability
in terms of scale and heterogeneity. We saw India and the
United States as major countries with large and diverse
populations, and increasing central concentration of political
economic power, constituting a move to governance with
increasingly authoritarian characteristics that tend to concentrate
power and privilege. Norway and Sweden being neighbouring
Nordic small states with similar, relatively homogenous
populations and welfare state functions (cf. Kristensen and Lilja,
2011) were not easy to separate along the four criteria in our country
analyses. And yet, it is imminently clear that both countries have
taken quite different approaches to dealing with COVID-19, aiming
to expand state authority in contrasting ways.
The form and execution of responses aligns with pre-existing
trends toward authoritarianism in India and the United States:
both played the blame game more or less openly, Trump by
accusing China for the spread, Modi and his Hindu nationalist
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government by blaming a Muslimmissionary organization. To the
extent that there has been a blame game in Norway, it has rational
roots in blaming people who broke the national “dugnad”
(teamwork) of mobility restrictions by going shopping in
Sweden, or visiting countryside cabins, without subsequent
quarantine. The lack of precise and binding regulations in
Sweden has meant reduced scope for apportioning blame, but
also a lack of accountability. Thus, the apportionment of
blame—transnationally in the United States, internally on a
vulnerable group in India, on sub-groups with formal violations
in Norway and negligibly in Sweden—reveals diverse political
ecologies linked with national discourses of viral spread pathways.
The rupture has also exposed hitherto debated truisms for
which there is now hard evidence: the callousness of the
leadership in the United States and India. This throws into
question the romanticized American dream. The United States
is undeniably a country of poor people: in 2016, 63% of US citizens
lackedUSD 500 in savings for an emergency, 34% had no savings at
all, and the official poverty rate was 12.7 percent (Edelman, 2020).
Comparably, while India has been regarded as poor but ascendant,
the nationalist myth of “India Shining” perpetuated by the ruling
party now appears very hollow in light of the COVID-19
pandemic. Not only does India lack a public health
infrastructure equipped to deal with crises, its state apparatus
has been unable to, and perhaps even unwilling to, tend to the
needs of poor workers, urban migrants and rural dwellers who are
rendered almost entirely dependent on state support in
emergencies. A large number of officially non-poor Indians in
reality live precarious lives, as Cyclone Amphan of May 2020
served as a stark reminder of, exacerbating COVID-19 adversity. In
both countries, the rupture reveals failures of governance to
adequately address inequity in their initial pandemic responses.
One apparent outcome of this reasoning is that the
United States is no longer an unquestionable global leader.
American exceptionalism has made it difficult to compare with
other countries until now. Its inability to cope with the pandemic
reveals weaknesses that tilt global geopolitical dynamics in favour
of China, whose authoritarian state apparatus enabled more
efficiently coordinated top-down action. Norway has closely
followed trends in the US, such as the war on drugs, the
invasion of Iraq, and neoliberal economic policies, but future
political appetite for such commitments may well diverge. With
US elections taking place in late 2020, the pandemic struck at a
crucial moment in its national politics, in a notably contrasting
manner to India, where the incumbent was re-elected in 2019.
As we note a range of worrying concerns, particularly in India
and the United States, we ask: has the pandemic created new
opportunities to exercise public control over governance decisions
such as resource allocation? In the United States, some Trump
supporters were displeased by restrictions on personal freedoms and
defied the state. India’s COVID-19 response accelerated existing
trends in the remaking of the state and consolidated its authority,
while also exposing uncomfortable truths and state weaknesses that
may open up new spaces for future political contestation. But our
analysis of this rupture is also revelatory in relation to uneasy
political phenomena that have surfaced in Sweden and Norway.
In Sweden, trust in experts for governance seems to continue
undeterred, supported by a political calculus to boost public
spending and return the welfare state centre-stage, increasing its
resource control at a time when many of its services have already
been contracted out to private providers. In Norway, the rupture
highlights a critical tussle as the harbinger of the coming choice for
its future national identity: will Norway remain contented with
continued dependence on an oil economy, or will this recognition of
its vulnerability to global economic and environmental vagaries
catalyze more vigorous debate on diversification for resilience, with
public opinion swaying governance decisions?
In light of the above, we revisit our hypotheses of the four
countries in Table 6. We argue that the rupture reveals some
departures from the truisms of scholarship. India and the
United States exhibit strong risks of elite capture, both display
low levels of commitment to affirmative action, and both show a
lack of trust in experts in their governance approaches—we had
hypothesized that the United States would fare better in all three
regards. This poorer than expected performance may be linked with
the specific political moment the United States was experiencing
during the pandemic, with pronounced authoritarian traits
comparable to political developments in India. Norway performs
better than Sweden on commitment to affirmative action, albeit
marginally, for its safeguarding of high-risk populations through a
broad approach. On the other hand, Sweden displays less tolerance
to authoritarian measures than Norway. We explain this by noting
that while both countries have strong trust in experts, their modes of
acting on this expertize differ: Norway coordinates thematic and
administrative expertize whereas Sweden takes a sector-specific
approach with experts in charge. This could well play out
differently in other kinds of ruptures than COVID-19 and sectors
other than healthcare, hence we are careful not to over-generalize
from this analysis.
CONCLUSION
In this article, we have compared and contrasted responses to
COVID-19 across four countries to understand core, dynamic
characteristics of governance—and thus the political ecology of








India High Very high Very low Very low
United States High High Very low Very low
Sweden Very low Very low High Very high
Norway Very low Low Very high High
Frontiers in Human Dynamics | www.frontiersin.org June 2021 | Volume 3 | Article 63642214
Sareen et al. A Rupture that Follows Rules
governance—in each country. This approach is based on the
urgent need for more scholarly engagement with realpolitik and
international relations as these take shape during dramatic
ruptures with emergent consequences, something that political
ecologists have been found wanting at (Braun, 2015). It is only by
embedding analyses within uncertain and still unfolding ruptures
that we can understand already emerging conjunctures clearly
and in a timely manner (Sultana, 2020). What we argue for is thus
the crystallizing function of a crisis such as COVID-19 for critical
scholarship on the state that challenges existing truisms.
During the present rupture, we note stronger recognition of
the role of the state across our countries. Expressions of stateness,
however, take on widely different characteristics, with a
concentration of power in top leadership with authoritarian
and anti-science policies in India and the United States, but a
recommitment to state support for marginalized groups and an
expanded role of the state in Norway and Sweden, albeit with
lacunae related to care workers in Sweden. The welfare state is
clearly back in favour, and perhaps so is the need for a welfare
state, having seen gradual erosion in all four countries. This
characterization may not seem to square easily with the
United States case, given the particular political moment it
was experiencing during the study period, but we point to
Trump’s extensive use of executive orders to act in deeply
impactful ways through the state apparatus. While many of
these interventions served to roll back the regulatory role of
the state, ironically they also underscored just how significant
state presence is in people’s lives, through centralized state
control over resources and territory (including mobility), and
over knowledge production. In both the United States and India,
there are notable sub-national differences in initial responses to
the extent that states exercise discretionary authority; while
beyond the scope of our study, this merits attention.
In the varied national responses to the pandemic, we find that
some issues have become depoliticized while others have become
repoliticized by drawing in new constituencies. Particularly in
Sweden, the almost complete placement of control in the hands of
the Public Health Authority and its technocratic experts, with the
government acting as financial backer rather than administrator,
has depoliticized the response. Science has served as a tool to
depoliticize resource allocation decisions and the exercise of state
authority on domains such as freedom of personal mobility, in
marked contrast with the more direct role of politics in Norway. It
is possible to attribute this to the Swedish constitution’s strong
emphasis on individual freedoms, which we see as co-constitutive
with contemporary national identity. This identity is in turn itself
socially reinforced; Sunnercrantz. (2020) argues that media
coverage strategically deployed narratives of Swedish
exceptionalism and the state epidemiologist contra other
domestic and foreign experts. While the Norwegian response
appears well in tune with science based on study period results,
the government adopted stricter guidelines than those
recommended by its public health experts, relating to the
stringency of lockdown, which raises questions of the scope of
its control over significant long-term resources, notably the
trillion dollar sovereign wealth fund. These differences are
perhaps best explained by different cultures of crisis
awareness, and a Swedish coalition government that was
weakly poized to act swiftly on complex issues at the time.
The moment in political dynamics when the pandemic arose
has clearly had some bearing on each of the four state responses.
Returning to our concern with political ecology research on state
quality and rupture (Lund 2016; Rasmussen and Lund 2018), we
reflect on the value of a comparative analysis of emergent state
responses to a major contemporary global rupture. This exercise has
enabled us to identify the key characteristics that are in play during
emergent reterritorialization dynamics for this particular rupture.
These dynamics include the sharpening and acceleration of existing
governance trends (e.g., elite capture and shifts toward
authoritarianism) as well as the emergence or contestation of
suppressed ones (e.g., welfare state expansion, the marginalization
of specific vulnerable groups). Political ecologists can extend such
enquiry by reflecting explicitly on the territorial strategies, political
capabilities and epistemological systems (Robbins, 2008) mobilized
by specific states in response to COVID-19. Such accounts can link
empirical analysis of the effect of power at multiple scales (which
Robbins is concerned with) to conceptualisations of emergent
contestation over state quality and the changing nature of
statehood (a concern that runs through Lund’s work) in greater
depth than we are able to offer in this four-country analysis. Norval.
(2016): 150) notes that “It is necessary to retain an analytical
distinction between the event of the crisis, and the discursive
articulation of that event as a crisis.” We hope to have conveyed
a situated sense of territorialization dynamics linked to this rupture
in its initial phase and to have thus furnished a basis for deeper
analyses of its protracted aftermath, in a manner that enables
political ecologists to draw approaches to characterizing
governance into generative entanglement.
To conclude, our comparative case analysis in four established
democracies indicates that longer-term trends of independent
institutions able to counterbalance authoritarian leaders—and to
thus maintain public checks to the concentration of power and
privilege in resource governance—appear dramatically missing at
“frontier moments” of rupture. Iterative ruptures over time allow for
radical institutional change or an intensification of a tendency that
serves the interests of well-positioned actors, notably incumbents.4
These are worrying traits for proponents of democracy, and for those
who cherish the concern of political ecology with equity, access and
rights in relation to the reconfigured governance of changing
ecologies. A wider range of state—including sub-
national—responses to such ruptures merit closer attention. We
hope this attempt will motivate others to study COVID-19 responses
in other contexts over time, and identify what sort of rules show
resurgence across ruptures, leading to a curious punctuated politics
of reconfiguration.
4As an instance of the latter, see government responses in terms of planned higher
fossil fuel production after COVID-19 in this report, which includes India, the
United States and Norway, accessed 16.4.2021: http://productiongap.org/
2020report.
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